This letter shows that the convertible group signature scheme presented by Kim et al. at Asiacrypt'96 is insecure with the suggested parameters and key generation process by presenting the respective attacks.
Introduction : A group signature scheme, rst introduced by Chaum and van Heyst 1] , is a signature scheme such that an individual member of a group can generate a signature, which can be veri ed by anyone, without revealing his identity and such that the signer can be identi ed later in case of disputes. At Asiacrypt'96 Kim et al. 2] presented a convertible group signature scheme, which has the additional property that the signer can convert, all or selectively, his group signatures into ordinary signatures by releasing some secret information.
This letter investigates the security of their convertible group signature schemes. First, we show that their suggested parameters cannot provide the level of security normally required by presenting an attack of complexity 2 37 steps. We also present some background to help to choose an appropriate size of parameters in their scheme or schemes using similar parameters. We next present another attack against the key generation process, where a legitimate group member can completely hide his identity even from the center by using a randomly derived secret key each time. This makes it impossible to identify a signer and convert group signatures. This problem remains still open.
The Convertible Group Signature Scheme : For the purpose of cryptanalysis we only describe a simpler group signature scheme (rather than more general scheme based on the -th residuosity problem) in 2] by following their notation. The GC (group center) chooses a modulus n = pq such that p = 2fp 0 + 1 and q = 2fq 0 + 1, where p; q; f; p 0 and q 0 are all primes (p 0 and q 0 distinct), generates a base element g of order f (i.e., g such that g 6 = 1 and g f = 1 mod n), and picks an integer of size 160 bits such that gcd( ; (n)) = 1 and computes a secret d such that d = 1 mod (n). The GC now publishes (n; ; g; f; h; ID G ) as a group public key and keeps d secret. Here h denotes a secure hash function and ID G a group identity information. Now each group member A randomly picks a secret s A in 0; f) and sends (ID A ; g s A mod n) to the GC. The GC then computes x A such that x A = (ID G g s A ) ?d mod n;
and sends it back to A securely. The GC stores a complete list of pairs (g s i mod n; ID i ) for the purpose of signer identi cation in case of disputes. Using these two secrets A can generate a signature (e; z 1 ; z 2 ) on message m by successively computing V = g r 1 r 2 mod n with random r 1 2 0; f) and r 2 2 0; n), e = h(V; m), and z 1 = r 1 + s A e mod f and z 2 = r 2 x e A mod n. The signature can be veri ed by anyone using the veri cation equation e = h(ID e G g z 1 z 2 mod n; m): The authors presented explicit procedures whereby all signatures by A could be converted into ordinary signatures by releasing the secret x A . We show that this is not true.
On the Parameter Selection : We rst describe an attack which can factor n in about 2 (jp 0 j?jfj)=2 steps (see also 3]), where we assume that p 0 and q 0 are of the same size in bits. Now we can use the above equation to solve for the unknown a. We choose an arbitrary number x in 0; n) to obtain x n?1 2f ?b (x ?f ) a 0 = (x 2 t f ) a 1 mod n and nd the unknowns a 0 and a 1 using the birthday paradox. For this we enumerate all possible values of each side and then search for equality. This can be done in about N log 2 N operations by sorting or N operations by hashing, where N = 2 t = 2 (jp 0 j?jfj)=2 . Since nding a is equivalent to factoring n, the security level of the group signature scheme cannot be larger than the above amount of operations.
The sizes of f and p 0 recommanded in 2] are jfj = 160 and jp 0 j = 234, for which the presented attack requires only 2 37 operations. This amount of computation and storage is quite feasible to the determined attacker. To get a complexity of about 2 80 operations for jfj = 160, we need to choose p 0 to be a number of around 320 bits.
Furthermore, the unforgeability of a group signature by the GC requires that the discrete logarithm problem mod n should be infeasible even with knowledge of p and q. In this respect, even a modulus of 1024 bits seems to provide only a marginal security from the state-of-the-art of current algorithms and technology. Thus we would like to recommand to use a modulus of at least 1536 bits (i.e., a product of two primes of 768 bits).
On the Security of Key Generation Process: We next point out that the scheme may be insecure without some precaution at the registration process. Suppose that a member A could receive two secrets x A and x 0 A for the public keys g s A mod n and g s 0 A mod n respectively such that s A = ab mod f and s 0 A = s A + b mod f. Then A can obtain ID ?d G mod n and g bd mod n by computing g bd = x A (x 0 A ) ?1 mod n and ID ?d G = x A (g bd ) a mod n. With knowledge of these two values, A can produce any pair of secret key (s A ; x A ) and thus can generate arbitrary valid group signatures without the fact being detected. We note that this attack can be mounted at a time by collusion of two group members.
We may counter the above attack by changing the key generation process as follows: When a group member A submits (ID A ; y 0 A = g s 0 A ) for registration, the GC picks two random numbers A G mod n. The problem is that there is no way to distinguish the use of a derived key from the use of the original. This makes it impossible to identify a signer or convert group signatures into ordinary signatures. We could not nd any solution for this problem yet. We remark that we have been informed that this problem was also discovered by Sang Joon Park (ETRI, Korea).
